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Fight after flight? An exploration of the radicalization potential among refugees in Greece

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ABSTRACT
Drawing on a survey of asylum seekers, the article provides a security assessment of the 'refugee experience' in Greece. This exploration of the 'refugee situation' on Europe's eastern shore touches upon refugees' prior and present grievances, the local and imported 'radical milieu' and (Greek) host state's will and capacity to implement sustainable and effective policies. The paper demonstrates that, although Greece lacks a developed radical milieu that could facilitate radicalization, Greece's policy of 'uninvolved tolerance' creates a vacuum that might be filled by radical groups in the future. Also, with the exception of minors' education, Greece scores low in most socio-economic indicators that delineate the 'refugee experience'. In this environment, scarce employment opportunities and dependence on external sources for life-sustainment interweave with institutionalization and negative coping mechanisms. These silent and largely hidden from the public eye processes might become the ingredients of future radicalization.

Fight or flight? Although often much more complex than a binary question, the choice between fighting or fleeing lies at the centre of every refugee situation across time and space. The initial decision to flee (instead of fight) is not final, though, but it is constantly 'renegotiated' in the course of refugees' – often difficult – journey to safety. The presence of radical militants among refugees, which has been a central theme in relevant debates, plays an important part in this 'renegotiation', but the radicalization process is often far less straightforward or immediately apparent.

This paper provides a multi-level exploration of this process of 'renegotiation' among refugees arriving on the eastern shore of the European migration control regime, Greece. As one of the main first-entry countries, Greece lies at the centre of discussions around the – security – implications of the 2015

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European 'refugee crisis'. This exploration of the Greek case is based on a questionnaire and interview-based survey in refugee camps in the Greek islands (Kara Tepe, Moria) and mainland (Elaionas, Skaramagkas), as well as interviews with Greek officials and members of the civil society.

Although numerous scholarly and policy-oriented studies have explored aspects of the refugee experience in Greece and Europe, this paper offers an important exploration of the impact this refugee experience might have on present and mostly long-term security. The paper does not claim to present a complete picture of the refugee situation in Greece or provide a definitive answer on the prospect of refugee radicalization. Instead, the paper's aim is to highlight and analyse the evolving trends and identify possible fields of concern, which would benefit from further research both in Greece and other European countries.

In this regard, the paper shows that the 'refugee experience' is built around grievances and connections forged along refugees' journey to safety (from the country of origin, through transit countries and to the host country). To cover this wide spectrum of inputs to the refugee experience, the paper draws from both traditional radicalization theories, which are largely built on examples of second – and third – generation descendants of economic migrants, and the field of refugee studies and, particularly, the refugee militarization scholarship, which accounts for the geographically extended grievances and networks of refugee populations. Most importantly, this paper illustrates that many security pitfalls are often silent and certainly less conspicuous than ISIS flags in refugee camps on European territory. Yet, they are at least equally as damaging in the long run, for they can build a radicalization-conducive environment, even where there was initially none.

The article is organized as follows. After a brief presentation of survey's identity and demographic data, the paper explores the components of the refugee experience in Greece and the associated security challenges. The first part of this discussion focuses on challenges linked to refugees' personal attributes, such as victimization and grievances. The second part, elevates grievances to the collective level and explores organizational aspects of the refugees' presence in Greece. The third part, which explores the systemic features and pressures that *inform* the 'refugee experience', probes Greece's *will* and *capacity* to address refugees' needs and associated security challenges. This last part, which concludes the discussion of survey's findings examines a wide spectrum of Greece's refugee-oriented policies in fields such as education and crime-management. The findings of the study across all three levels are summarized in the final section that provides an evaluation of the situation in Greece and draws wider implications.

Survey of the radicalization potential in refugee populations in Greece

In the webs of the Greek refugee control regime: identity and demographics of the study

This paper draws from author's field-study in Greece (May-December 2018). The first leg of the field-study focused on interviews with Greek officials and members of the civil society, who are involved in the management of the refugee situation in various capacities and fields. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, allowing also space for new insights. The second leg of the fieldwork involved visits to refugee camps in the Attica region (Elaionas, Skaramagkas) and Lesvos island (Kara Tepe, Moria). Arranging these visits turned out to be a lengthy process, largely to the persistently *bureaucratic* culture of the Greek administration. During the visits to the camps, which occurred in November and December 2018, questionnaires were handed to residing refugees. The distributed questionnaires were designed to outline participants' overall refugee experience. After questionnaires' completion, a semi-structured interview followed, which aimed at elaborating some aspects of the completed questionnaire.

Participants were selected through a partly randomized and partly 'snowballing' process. This 'snowball' selection process allowed the study to include participants that possess wide-ranging, yet focused, characteristics, rendering the sample as representative as possible. Participants were called to answer a questionnaire (consisting of 48 questions), which was available in three languages (English, Arabic and Farsi). The questionnaire answers were further discussed in a semi-structured interview, with the assistance of Arabic-speaking and Farsi-speaking interpreters when necessary.

In total, there were 53 participants in the survey, almost equally distributed across the four camps. Most participants were male (47) and predominantly young (24 in the age group 18–25), while half of the participants (mainly male) were single (25). The majority originated from Syria (35), followed by Afghanistan (10) and Iraq (7). While refugees from Middle East were predominantly Arabs (36), refugees from Afghanistan were more disparate (including participants from Pashtu, Hazara, Tajik and Sadat community). In terms of religion, the majority were Muslim (37 Sunni, 10 Shia); the remaining belonged to religious minorities (e.g. Yazidi). Apart from *selection bias* in recruiting participants from Syria and Afghanistan, the other variations were random.

The refugee experience: trauma, grievances and more

When refugees cross the borders, together with their few belongings, they carry along an intangible baggage, in the shape of past experiences, grievances, networks and mobilization opportunities. These past experiences and

connections forge a link that stretches from the country of origin, where their initial decision to flee was made, often across several transit countries, to the country of final destination, where refugees are called to create a new home often under unhospitable conditions.

Past experiences, especially if they are traumatic, act as an under-layer for real or perceived victimization to form and grievances to accrue.[1] The survey shows high prevalence of traumatic experiences among refugees, which predate their arrival to Greece. One in five participants had been injured in their home country and more than one in three have been imprisoned or detained by government forces or militant groups (including ISIS). If we include participants with family members or friends, who have been injured or killed, then the percentage of participants with some type of violent experience in their home country rises to 73%. This finding is corroborated by the head of the MSF mission in Greece, who was interviewed by the author,[2] and several reports.[3]

This baggage of physical and emotional trauma originates in their country of origin and is directly linked to refugees' *cause of flight*. The survey shows that 'pull factors' (e.g. family/friends already in Europe, quest for a better life), have a moderate effect on the motivations behind participants' flight. 'Push factors' appear to have a much larger impact; an expected finding for a refugee population. Most respondents stated that they decided to flee because 'there is war in their country'. Half as many attributed their decision to flee to fears related to their religion/ethnicity. On the contrary, only 13% stated that their political activity was behind their decision to flee. Interestingly, though, many stated that their decision was at least partly influenced by their fear of forced conscription in the army or an armed group.

As Sarah Lischer convincingly shows, refugees' cause of flight influences militarization.[4] Lischer proposes a typology of three refugee ideal-types; situational, persecuted and state-in-exile. Each type appears to be associated with different levels of militarization potential, with situational refugees presenting the lowest and state-in-exile refugee populations the highest potential, largely due to the political and military organizational skills the latter bring with them.[5]

The findings above show that most refugees in the sample resemble *situational* refugees, in the sense that they have fled generalized violence. This is more pronounced among Syrians. Asylum seekers from Iraq and Afghanistan, on the other hand, better fit the *persecuted* type, that is refugees, who have fled because they were specifically targeted due to their religious or ethnic identity. This reasoning was dominant in the accounts of Yazidi and (Shia) Hazara participants from these countries, which revolved around a narrative of religious persecution in the hands of the 'Islamic State' and Taliban. Yet, none of the two communities seemed to pursue an organized response to this persecution, beyond the unifying memory of collective suffering, which as shown below, affects in- and out-groups' relations. In

any case, the prevalence of the persecuted type among refugees, who do not fit the typical – Sunni Arab – radicalization profile, demonstrates that vulnerable to militarization populations can be found in 'unusual places'.

A second implication is that, prima facie, refugees in Greece do not seem to fit the *state-in-exile* category. Slightly more than one in ten attributed their flight to their prior political activity (scattered across different countries of origin). This finding is supported by additional questions regarding prior political activity (as member of political party, armed group, or local self-protection unit). It should be noted, though, that several participants that initially stated that their political activity influenced their flight, were later hesitant to define the nature of this activity. It is possible, then, that the number of refugees that fit the *state-in-exile* category, is higher. In any case, though, as shown below, even in cases of prior political or military activity, this activity has not been transposed, at least in an organized way, to the Greek territory.

Survey participants, also, identified victimization beyond their country of origin. Half participants claimed to 'have been mistreated during their journey to Greece'. Here, however, we should note that some described the hardships of their trip as violence. A similar pattern is evident when it comes to violence experienced in Greece, as difficult living conditions, especially in Moria, are experienced by many refugees as violence. Unfortunately, the survey is not conclusive on the question of victimization in Greece. When explored in conjunction with violence experienced in their home country or during their journey, participants tended to downplay the violence they experienced in Greece. On the contrary, when the question was raised separately later in the questionnaire, after an exploration of their living conditions, almost half answered positively.

Trauma is not directly associated with radicalization; victimization can equally as often lead to violence aversion. Still though, past traumatic experiences form the bedrock of refugees' grievances and preserve a persisting connection to these places and people. The tighter the cord that links them to the events back home, the more entrenched initial – personal and collective – grievances become. To test participants' link to their home countries, they were asked about how often 'they read news about their country' and 'communicate with friends back home'. Asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Iraq, seemed to preserve a stronger bond to their home-countries, since almost half of the participants from these countries claimed that they read news about their home countries daily. This trend was not identified among Syrians, as many Syrian participants claimed they never read news (about Syria) because 'it makes them angry and sad' or because 'they are not interested in what happens in their country'. This pattern is replicated in the second question, as almost half of Syrian participants stated that they talked to friends back home 'rarely' or 'never'. These findings demonstrate

that Syrian refugees to some extent are akin to 'Rubicon refugees'; that is refugees, who decide to 'turn their back' to their past lives.[6] This detachment from events back home comports with the prevalence of situational refugees among Syrians.

It is apparent, then, that at their arrival at the shores of Greece (and Europe), refugees already hold a varying degree of grievances and attachment to their home-countries. In Greece, these grievances slowly combust under difficult living conditions, demoralizing uncertainty and frustrated expectations. While dissatisfaction with specific aspects of their living conditions will be discussed below, here we delve deeper into the impact of uncertainty and 'acculturative stress'.

For one, frustrated expectations stem from the widespread perception of entrapment in Greece. Less than one in ten survey participants (none Syrian) considered Greece as a possible final destination when they left their country. Among them, one has lived in Greece as a migrant in the past and has family here and another justified his answer by saying '*It is better in Greece because where people are poor, life is better*'. Not many had changed their mind in the meantime either. The majority (4 in 5), instead, saw in Greece a frustration of their expectations. Among them, some showed determination to continue their journey, while others appeared to 'come to terms' with new realities (only one showed intention to return).

Frustrated expectations are magnified under conditions of uncertainty and limbo. Uncertainty is primarily linked to their status in Greece. The overwhelming majority had applied for asylum in Greece; yet only one in ten had secured a refugee status and even fewer (8%) were issued a rejection decision (interestingly half of them Syrians). This prevalence of refugees with pending decisions can be explained by the geographical focus of the study. Refugees that are granted asylum are expected to move out of the camps to alternative – sponsored – housing or self-sustained living. However, this may take several months. Over a third of survey participants had arrived to Greece more than a year ago, with many among them over 2 years. Delays in issuing decisions' have increased since the EU-Turkey agreement. The Agreement led to a surge in asylum applications (as last resort against forced return) and created a huge backlog in the nascent Greek Asylum Service.[7] It is no surprise then that many had an asylum interview set on a date over a year later.

The longer the stay in the camp, the larger the impact of uncertainty and difficult living conditions on individuals' 'acculturative stress'.[8] This study addresses 'acculturative stress' by exploring its impact on participants' behaviour and relations with their family. A significant portion of participants had seen relations with their family to be negatively affected. This deterioration includes tensions with spouses and the overall feeling of inability to provide for the family and exert control over children and family's future. Similar findings have been reported in other studies that show that many parents

are dealing with high stress, uncertainty and anxiety, which makes them more liable to become neglectful or violent towards their children.[9] This type of neglectfulness was witnessed also by the author during the fieldwork.

Comparable results were found in regard to changes in participants' behaviour. More than half Iraqis and a quarter of Syrians and Afghans reported that, since their arrival to Greece, they 'tend to argue more'. A significantly higher percentage – especially among Iraqis – claimed to have 'retreated from social interactions'. While most Iraqis and Afghans demonstrated a reaction to 'stress' characterized by seclusion, Syrians were somehow divided, with half saying that they had become more social. The trend towards seclusion among Iraqis and Afghans might be partly explained by the larger number of *persecuted refugee types* in these communities. Another interesting finding is that only 13% stated that they had resorted to religion and became more pious.

In sum, as the discussion above shows, refugees in Greece present an array of old and new grievances, frustration, psychological vulnerability and diverse reactions to 'acculturative stress'. At this level, the exploration of the Greek case offers some counterintuitive findings, which testify to the importance of past grievances and country-of-origin variables. It is noteworthy that the survey finds higher levels of victimization and negative reactions to acculturative stress in refugee communities that do not fit the typical radicalization profile. In other words, it is the non-Arab and non-Sunni refugees that exhibit more radicalization-related characteristics. At the same time, it is important to note that Greece does not seem to host a large number of refugees that fit the *state-in-exile ideal-type*, which is associated with higher levels of militarization. In any case, though, as the next part demonstrates, refugees in Greece do not seem to carry along developed political or military organizational structures, which feature in cases of state-in-exile refugee populations.

Collective grievances and organizational structures: an exploration of the 'radical milieu' in Greece

The militarization potential of traumatic experiences and grievances remains unfulfilled in the absence of a 'radical milieu' that will act as a conveyor belt for 'personal grievances' to acquire a collective form. This radical milieu might take the form of 'hijacked mosques', Islamist organizations or the salafi sub-culture.[10] On a first note, Greece, as a relatively new country of migrant destination, is not expected to have a developed (home-grown) Islamic milieu that could capitalize on refugees' frustration.[11] However, as the following discussion demonstrates, Greece faces several long-term challenges.

For one, the Athens Mosque, a thorny issue for several years,[12] has finally reached its completion. The lack of a mosque in a large city with an increasing

number of Muslim residents has pushed religious practice to the underground. For a population of over 150.000, only a handful Muslim prayer-houses operate under an official license, leaving room for over a hundred unofficial prayer-houses – usually in unsuitable spaces – to mushroom in central Athens.[13] The opening of the Athens Mosque is undoubtedly a positive step towards bringing Muslim religious practice into the open. However, it is far from ideal. The rather unappealing construction, which was described by the head of the Muslim Association of Greece, as nothing but 'a big kiosk'[14] has several drawbacks. The limited capacity of the Athens Mosque to fulfil the religious needs of all its Muslim inhabitants, especially during religious festivals, organizational controversies and the *unpractical* cohabitation of diverse sects, all point to the continuing 'demand' for unofficial places of worship in Athens and in Greece.

In regards to refugees, the survey has found low preference in total for prayer-houses outside the camps (15% of practicing Muslim participants). This relatively low preference for outside-camp prayer-houses is expected among refugees residing in camps, especially those in more remote areas. It is no surprise, then, that all who frequented outside-camp prayer-houses resided in the two camps in the Attica region (Elaionas and Skaramagkas). Those who did, preferred prayer-houses around Omonoia square (central Athens), with some attending frequently (every day) and others on occasions. The selection of a prayer-house, apart from proximity, was also influenced by ethnic and sectarian considerations. Participants showed a clear preference for prayer-houses run and attended by co-nationals and co-religionists; a preference in full tandem with Athens prayer-house anthropogeography.[15]

Whatever the current level of refugees' attendance to Athens unofficial prayer-houses, demand for places of worship is expected to increase as more refugees move to urban housing. Although Greek security agencies seem to keep an eye on prayer-houses – often rather ineptly, as the imam of one of these prayer-houses has told the author[16] – this is not viable in the long run, when the demand for praying facilities increases. Inevitable as it is, this increase renders the regularization of unofficial prayer-houses a priority, if one wants to avoid instances of 'hijacked mosques' in the future.

Greece might lack a developed local Islamic milieu, but Islamist groups and ideas have a presence in Greece. For example, groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood have a relatively long presence in Greece; most notably the Muslim Association of Greece. Yet, they largely keep a low and law-abiding profile and, most importantly, do not seem to make a concrete effort to reach out to refugees arriving in Greece. The findings of the study on Muslim Brotherhood's *arch enemies*, salafis, is more intriguing. Again, Greece does not present a prevalent salafi sub-culture that has been associated with radicalization in Europe. Yet, there is a nascent salafi presence in Greece, largely active in (salafi) prayer-houses and online.[17] However, these salafi are

part of the so-called *quietist* trend in salafi Islam, which avoids involvement in politics (including political violence) and focuses on outreach through religious teaching (dawa). Interestingly, outside the realm of prayer-houses and online dawa, this type of salafi outreach has reached (with authorities' permission) Muslim detainees in Greek prisons.[18] However, the study did not find evidence of similar outreach effort towards refugees. Interviews on both sides have shown that although possibly some refugees attend salafi prayer-houses, there is no active effort from the latter to attract followers.

On the contrary, and what is perhaps the most surprising finding, it is Christian groups, who actively reach out to refugees in an effort to proselytize them. Less than one in ten stated that they have been approached by Muslim groups; most of the times in some form of zakat. On the contrary, over half have been approached by Christian groups. These groups are not associated with the official Greek Orthodox Church, which is involved in refugee relief programs but does not carry a proselytizing project. Instead, these individuals, who often stand outside refugee camps and approach refugees' traffic in and out of the camp, belong to Christian evangelical groups.

Camp authorities do not allow them inside the camp but show tolerance to their activities outside the camp. For instance, in Kara-Tepe, a Christian group has been distributing, as some refugees claimed, clothes and other necessities from an abandoned building near the camp. In Athens, these Christian-run facilities are significantly more organized, as the author's visit to a similar refugee-oriented facility showed. This refugee centre, situated in central Athens, was run by an evangelical (charismatic) group and at the time of the visit, around forty refugees were there to seek legal advice, clothes and food, which was conveniently served after the sermon. At the conclusion of the sermon, the female pastor also proudly acknowledged the increasing number of converts among Muslim refugees.

Follow-up interviews with survey participants showed that this outreach often generates a counter-reaction among Muslim refugees, who appeared to cling as a result on their religion. Interestingly, strongly religious respondents downplayed the importance of Christian proselytism, stating that a true Muslim would never disown his faith, alluding thus that converts never were true Muslims in the first place. This view was reiterated by the head of the salafi Salaf-us-Saalih prayer-house in Athens who, in his interview with the author, one man claimed that also paralleled his group's *dawa* activities with Christian outreach, claiming equal rights and freedom to preach for both.[19] Frustration, on the contrary, was more evident among traditional – yet not necessarily most religious – participants, who experienced Christian outreach as a threat to their religion and culture.

Hence, it appears that Greece, at least for the moment, lacks this kind of developed local Islamic milieu that could act as a conveyor belt to Islamic radicalization. Most importantly, its level of access to refugees is limited; if any,

it is Christian groups that reach out to refugees in Greece. For refugees, however, the radical milieu is not restricted to the host country. It might be carried along from the home country, or it might form from scratch in the host country, as part of a collective identity formation. In both cases, this radical milieu might operate and evolve outside the influence of the local milieu.

The presence of former militants among refugees is the most apparent example of such radical milieu, especially in the case of state-in-exile refugees. As noted above, the survey has shown that refugees in Greece mainly fit the situational and persecuted type, with respect to their cause of flight. Even participants with a cause of flight that could place them in the category of state-in-exile refugees, did not seem to continue their previous political activity. There is no doubt, of course, that even if some did, it would possibly go under-reported. A similar under-reporting might be also assumed in the question of the presence of former militants or soldiers among refugees. Only 15% had been members of their country's army in the period before their flight; interestingly, a significant part of them from Afghanistan. Compare this to high number of individuals – the majority Arab Syrians – whose decision to flee was influenced by the fear of forced conscription. Remarkably, only one participant (from Iraq) stated that he was a member of a self-protection armed group, which introduces the elephant in the room: the presence of ISIS militants among refugees.

There have been several reports on European ISIS-affiliated networks extending to Greece[20] or ISIS presence in refugee camps in Greece.[21] Nevertheless, at the time of the field-study (November-December 2018), there was no visible presence of ISIS. There were some claims, mainly from Yazidi or Shia refugees, that there were ISIS members or sympathizers in the camp; even among their neighbours. However, it seems that if there is indeed a presence, it is discrete. When this presence became more visible and public – as happened in Moria in the summer of 2018 – it was soon dismantled and those involved arrested, as several refugees from Moria attested.

Although refugees in Greece do not seem to carry along significant organized political and military *capital*, there is evidence of collective identity formation and nascent alternative socio-political structures. These could include the operation of makeshift mosques inside (and around) camps, collective groups and activities and other indicators of collective identity formation, such as trust towards in-group and out-groups.

One in five survey participants claimed to attend in-camp mosques. Most non-Sunnis, however, preferred to pray alone or with their families and friends and several noted the lack of respective (non-Muslim) places of worship in the camp. It is noteworthy that only one Shia said that he attended the camp mosque, although it was run by Sunnis or (as many Shia Afghans claimed) 'Pakistanis'.

Three out of the four camps (Elaionas, Skaramagkas, Moria) had a makeshift mosque inside the camp. All three operated in an unofficial capacity, with camp authorities demonstrating tolerance but no active involvement. The tolerance exerted in the above three camps was absent in Kara Tepe. The camp administrator, who has a military background, has officially banned places of worship inside the premises of the camp. As a result, a group of refugees set up a makeshift mosque outside the camp in a nearby abandoned building. The self-proclaimed imam and some regular visitors of the makeshift mosque were interviewed for the survey. With evident salafi influences in attire and manner of speech, and initially hesitant and wary, they bemoaned the administrator's decision to ban the operation of a mosque inside the camp; a decision that forced them to practice their religious duties in unsuitable and degrading conditions.

The case of Kara Tepe confirms that ignoring the religious needs of individuals does not make them disappear; it just hides them from public view, but also the *eyes and ears* of authorities. The policy of 'tolerance' – but not active involvement – that governs decisions in the three other camps fares no better. In Skaramagkas, for instance, this lack of state involvement prompted the (self-appointed) imam of the camp's mosque to seek assistance from the Saudi and UAE embassies in Athens, but also long-residing Muslim migrants in Greece. In his interview with the author, he claimed that his efforts had limited success (the Saudi embassy and migrants provided few prayer mats), however, this case demonstrates how external actors (often with bad record) might influence refugees' religious 'formation', when the state decides to abstain.

Another interesting finding is the limited role community leaders play in dispute resolution and communication with camp authorities. Only two participants (both Afghans) said that, when they had a problem or an emergency, they asked their community representative for help. In general, in all camps, the Afghan community seemed to have more prominent community leaders. One possible explanation is that, for Syrian Arabs, the community's point of reference is embodied in another type of traditional elite, the sheikh/imam; at least that was the impression left from Skaramagkas and Kara Tepe. In any case, both communities claimed that community leaders were useful only in food distribution and occasionally in inter- and intra-community conflict resolution. As one refugee in Elaionas claimed, based on his experience in other camps (Moria, Thiva and Malakasa), 'community representatives *exist* where trouble and fights exist'.

If the limited role of community leaders projects a picture of enfeebled traditional elites, which is not unusual considering that displacement can unsettle established power structures,[22] the underlying attitudes towards out-groups demonstrate a nascent collective identity formation. The majority said that since their arrival to Greece their new friends had been 'mainly

refugees from the same ethnic community'. The religious identity of their new friends appeared less significant, but still noteworthy. Distrust towards out-groups is perhaps best illustrated in the frequency of fights between ethnic and religious groups. These fights, which often lead to bloodshed, have been documented in several camps across Greece.[23] Indeed, a quarter of participants have claimed to have been attacked by members of another community and some were injured in a fight or riot. Afghans claim fights break out between Kurds and Arabs. Kurds, on the contrary, claim that it is Afghans and Syrian Arabs who fight, while Arabs either downplay the importance of incidents or blame everything on Afghans. Most agree, though, that most fights break out in the food distribution line. Indeed, in Kara Tepe, which implements a policy of door-to-door food distribution, and Elaionas, which provides pre-fabricated houses with basic cooking facilities, incidents of fighting or rioting are rare. On the contrary, in Moria, the example par excellence of unorganized (and crowded) settlement and service provision, fights are frequent.

Distrust towards out-groups does not always follow the Afghan-Arab line. There are also examples of intra-communal distrust and tensions. The best example is the distrust towards Syrians from Deir ez-Zor (the epicentre of ISIS activity in Syria), which was expressed by several participants, both from communities that were targeted by ISIS and other Sunni Arabs from Syria. Likewise, refugees from Deir ez-Zor detailed in their accounts widespread hostility, which was aggravated by administration's occasional oversights, such as placing Yazidi families in nearby caravans. As a result, refugees from Deir ez-Zor tended to band together. Most travelled from Syria in large groupings consisting of families and – village – neighbors. This microcosm was preserved in the camps in Greece, as they mostly kept to themselves and interacted only with 'friends from the village'. Interestingly, the survey has identified also instances of intra-community distrust and violence, directed against individuals, who had worked for the coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. For one participant, this hostility, which he attributed to his work as a translator for foreign contractors in Afghanistan, prompted his transfer from Elefsina camp to Skaramagkas.

The veil of distrust covered also relations with non-refugee out-groups, such as state authorities and NGOs. Slightly more than half claimed that in case of a problem or emergency they sought help from the police or state authorities. Afghans were more likely to trust Greek authorities and especially the police. This is rather counterintuitive, given that many Afghan participants expressed their belief that state authorities favour Syrian refugees, by fast-tracking their applications and relocating them to the mainland at the expense of refugees from Afghanistan. In any case, when the question came to whom they trust to 'get information about their rights and options', the level of trust to Greek authorities dropped to 13%. International organizations

and NGOs fared slightly better; yet, they were largely approached for specialized assistance rather than as a general point of reference.

The majority instead referred to members of their community. The community often played the role of a grapevine, through which practical information were passed down to new-arrivals; from information on issuing a social security number (AMKA) to informal job opportunities. At the same time, next to the *pre-modern* kinship and friendship networks, the internet appears as an equally important source of information for refugees. This finding is in line with an increasing number of studies that demonstrate the centrality of ICT in (young) refugees' navigation through the hurdles of displacement.[24]

In sum, Greece has an undeveloped local radical milieu, at least compared to other European countries, but she faces several structural deficiencies and future challenges. Likewise, the refugee population in Greece does not appear to carry an *active imported* radical milieu. However, there are signs of a nascent collective identity in the form of out-group distrust. The direction of this collective identity formation is largely influenced by factors beyond the immediate control of refugees and the radical milieu. State attributes and policies and the balance between state capacity and will to tackle the implications of the refugee crisis are the final arbiters of the refugee experience.

The suspended step of Greece at refugee management: the policies behind the refugee experience

The personal and collective dynamics, outlined in the previous pages, are not immune to external systemic and environmental influences.[25] Ultimately, it is state policies that set the wider environment – the objective conditions – for the radical imperative and subjective interpretations to resonate with real-life references and experiences. Issues such as settlement, living conditions and camp safety touch upon the early stages of the refugee experience, when refugees' needs are acute and policy impact immediate. Additional policy fields, such as employment opportunities and access to education are (ideally) formed at the early stages but their impact is mostly felt in the mid-term.

Refugee flows have a durable impact on state structures and various aspects of their host communities' lives. Inherent features, such as ethno-religious composition and the existence of dormant political rifts interweave with volatile developments such as economic or political crises. Although in the long-term, refugees often benefit the host state and population,[26] frictions, contagions and counter-contagions are inevitable.

State ability to avoid escalation rests on two pivots: state **capacity** and **will**.[27] A host state's **capacity** consists of its economic, organizational and human capital, which is called to 'manage' refugees' arrival. Not all states

possess the same capacity. Greece, for instance, which is heavily strained and constrained by a prolonged economic crisis, does not have the same capacity as Sweden. However, security fallouts are not always the product of lacking state capacity. Equally as often, the host state – or some elements within the state – lack the **will** to accommodate refugees and implement essential – but often unpopular – policies. In the current refugee crisis, this translates into a shift towards far-right rhetoric and political forces in Europe.

Greece has not been immune to anti-immigration rhetoric. However, at the apex of the refugee crisis in 2015, a Syriza-led coalition government came to power, which held relatively positive views towards refugees. At the same time, Greece experienced reduced anti-immigration rhetoric and violence, largely due to the criminal charges brought against the Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, which had been the hegemonic force of the far-right in Greece in the past years.

In 2019, this came to an end. The early July elections drove Golden Dawn out of the Greek parliament. Although undoubtedly a positive outcome, it is uncertain how Golden Dawn's leadership and rank-and-file will react to this return to extra-parliamentary politics. There is already evidence of fragmentation, as several high-ranking members and former MPs have opted to jump ship. The electoral debacle in conjunction with the imminent completion of the criminal trial, might also affect the levels of violence, bringing them closer to pre-2015 levels. This shift might be further fuelled as new groups from the far-right radical milieu spring out, exploiting Golden Dawn's woes and the rise of nationalist feeling due to the recent Greece-North Macedonia agreement.[28]

These fermentations in the Greek far-right unfold as a new conservative government assumes power. The victory of the right-wing New Democracy party in the July elections, will probably impact the refugee management regime and discourse, especially if the Mitsotakis-led conservative government decides to cling to anti-immigration and anti-refugee rhetoric and policies in order to placate the *repatriated* far-right voters. This turn in Greece's political climate will not only impact Greece in terms of reduced **political will**, but it will possibly also reshuffle and redirect the available state **capacity**. It might be a tell-tale sign that, on its first day, the new government decided to abolish the Ministry of Migration Policy and bring migration management under the purview of the Ministry of Citizen Protection (Public Order).

The Greek record in refugee management

Since 2015, Greece has received over 1.5 million migrants/refugees. Most have continued their journey, often irregularly, while 73.000 are said to remain in Greece (a quarter of which in the Greek islands).[29] Over these years, the Greek state has managed to bring some structure to the early chaos. In a sense, the Greek state has reclaimed a central role after its initial bewildered passivity amidst the 2015 refugee flow, which allowed a general

spirit of privatized relief operations to prevail and external actors to take the lead in refugee management. Over this period, Greece has rebuilt a largely defunct Asylum Service,[30] amidst a spike in asylum applications in the wake of the EU-Turkey agreement, set up 34 refugee settlements and developed policies in domains such as accommodation schemes, education and health-care.[31]

In regards to settlement, Greece has implemented several accommodation policies, that differ in type (camps vs rented apartments), geographical location (urban vs remote settlements) and the level of state control (closed camps vs unorganized/unofficial). Due to the specific scope of the study, the paper focuses on camp settlements that differ, though, across other variables (e.g. island/mainland, open/closed camps). It should be noted that around 30.000 asylum seekers have access to alternative accommodation. Greece, in cooperation with UNHCR, implements a housing program called 'ESTIA', which provides rented apartments to 22.000 asylum seekers, while another 8.000 are (temporally) hosted in rented rooms and hotels under other cooperation schemes.[32] Most accommodation places of this type are in urban areas, with more than half in the Attica region.[33]

An early general conclusion regarding the living conditions in camp settlements is that urban and organized – yet open – camps seem to provide better conditions. For Greece, this means that at least the refugee experience in terms of accommodation improves on the way. Nevertheless, although accommodation satisfaction was higher in mainland camps (especially in Elaionas), overall more than half participants rated their living conditions as unsatisfactory (1–2). In Moria, this trend was almost universal. Many attributed their dissatisfaction to the size and state of their lodging and the level of camp and house facilities. Equally as often, they stressed the issue of constant noise and the lack of privacy. The latter was often associated with reduced socialization, as many stated that it was hard (and embarrassing) to invite guests.

Perhaps the most interesting finding is that camps seem to become the focal point for refugees who do not have a steady place to live. This often reveals the existence of an accommodation '*black economy*', as several participants claimed to pay rent to the rightful occupants, who have left the camp and often the country, without informing camp authorities. On other occasions, it takes the form of makeshift – unorganized – living arrangements in areas around the camp, where individuals sleep while spending the day in camp's premises. Contrary to other – widely documented – forms of refugee squatting, such as open parks and ports in the past, and more recently abandoned trains[34] and semi-organized solidarity squats[35], this is one of the less-studied types of squatting.

The growing demand for alternative housing is fuelled by the increasing number of refugees in the Greek mainland, who exist outside the official refugee management system. Indeed, the survey identified a significant

number of – usually young – men who had arrived to Greece after March 2016 and had left the islands *irregularly*, before an asylum decision was reached. Their situation was more precarious because by leaving the islands without official sanction, which since 2016 requires a final asylum decision,[36] they cannot benefit from various state provisions (i.e. housing, cash-card), and are forced to survive in an environment of limited employment options.

The overwhelming majority of survey participants (80%) were unemployed at the time of the interview; while 80% of them stated that they were looking for a job. Only one in ten had some type of employment; most in refugee-run businesses in the camp. These businesses may vary in size and type: from Moria's open-air bazaar of second-hand clothes and utensils to Skaramagkas's organized small businesses (e.g. mini-market, bakery, barber shop). This type of self-employment might also occur outside the public view, as the case of a female participant, who provided hairdressing services inside her pre-fabricated house, demonstrates.

The lack of employment options has several implications. First, it translates into a persisting dependence on external sources for life-sustainment, which in turn reduces the feeling of self-dependence. Indeed, most relied on financial assistance from international organizations, in the form of the UNHCR-run cash card system, which allocates monthly cash assistance ranging from 90 euros (single) to 550 euros (family of seven and more). The allocated amount is much lower than what an average Greek family earns (656,25 euros in 2018), which is already low.[37] In any case, this type of cash assistance, though preferable to food distribution, remains an (uncertain) handout. The precariousness of this lifeline was raised by several refugees. (Married) male respondents often also hinted at their reduced role as breadwinners, which was in contravention to their cultural norms. One participant, in fact, claimed that he often left the camp during the day, so that his children would not see their father being idle.

External dependence also takes the form of occasional financial help from friends or family, most often located in other European countries, which highlights the extension of linkages and nodes developed under the current 'refugee crisis'. Largely outside the control of the European migration control regime, these networks can easily assume a dual-use purpose, providing the basis for radical network formation and exploitation, much alike the *hawala* system. At the same time, this equally precarious dependence gives birth to feelings of meaninglessness-of-self and perceived loss of control over one's family, status, and future; feelings that are often fundamental to the radicalization process, particularly among young (semi)qualified men.[38]

Although asylum seekers arriving to Greece, as the survey corroborates, were primarily employed as low-skilled workers or owned a small business in their country, it is important to note that the study showed an – until

recently – active population. Furthermore, if one controls for participants' level of education, it is evident that the job market in their home country often did not comport to their skills. Equally significant is the frequency of teenagers and young adults with interrupted high school or university education. These young adults are the epitome of a lost-generation and as such they are the most vulnerable.

Greece has made efforts to address the problem with the introduction of the 'European Qualifications Passport for Refugees' program. Introduced in 2017, it offers refugees with interrupted education or lost certificates an opportunity to have their skills assessed and verified. Although the Qualifications Passport does not replace official documents, it is a first step back to academic and professional normality. However, in two years of operation and four calls for applications, only 140 asylum seekers took advantage of this opportunity. The low turnout can be partly explained by Ministry's poor information campaign. For example, in the last call for applications, the link-title of the English and Arabic informational leaflet and application was written in Greek, rendering this information largely inaccessible to non-Greek speaking refugees.[39] It is no surprise, then, that none of the study participants had any knowledge of the Program, even in the Attica region. The low turnout can also be attributed to the prevailing sense of futility, which was expressed by many, in pursuing some type of official recognition of their studies and skills.

This veil of futility is evident also in the low participation in educational and, to a lesser degree, professional training programs. Less than half survey participants had been enrolled in educational programs; none was enrolled in high school, vocational school or university. Indeed, most had only attended language courses, of whom only a small fraction Greek language courses. This translates into fewer (legal) employment opportunities and lower integration prospects in the long run. More tellingly, a third stated that they had no intention to enrol in any type of educational program because they 'have other priorities'. Unfortunately, half of them, under the age of 30.

Fortunately, this futility is not replicated in the education of minors. Most parents in the survey had children enrolled in school or some other type of educational program or planned to enrol them when they reach school age. It is noteworthy that none stated that children's education is not a priority at the moment. Indeed, Greece, since academic year 2016–17, makes a praiseworthy effort to bring refugee children into schools. During the 2018–9 academic year, 12,687 refugee children of school age attended preparatory or morning classes.[40] For comparison reasons, in Italy the number of children enrolled in mainstream formal education at the same period was 168.[41]

To achieve this, the Department of Coordination and Overview of Refugees' Education in the Ministry of Education often had to come up with creative solutions to persuade parents to insist on their children's education or to

overcome the inflexibility of the Greek bureaucracy.[42] In the beginning, it also had to assert its authority over several school headmasters and parents' associations across Greece, who disagreed with the establishment of classes for refugee children. On some occasions, these protests turned violent as various Golden Dawn MPs made their inflammatory appearance in school units in the months after the first 'Reception Facilities for Refugee Education' (RFRE) opened in October 2016. The ministry's decision not to succumb to the pressure and stick to the initial plan in terms of specific school units and number of pupils was essential to averting similar protests in the following year. Still though, in autumn 2018, a new wave of protests occurred in some schools in Greek islands with hot-spots, where until that year refugee children had no access to education, as their stay was considered temporary.[43]

Although Greece implements a laudable educational program for refugee children, it continues to face lower enrolment and higher dropout rates as one moves from primary to secondary education. To make things worse, the Greek refugee education program is limited to mandatory education (up to 14 years old). Minors of 15–18 years have the right to enrol in academic and vocational schools, but the numbers are extremely low.[44] Often plagued by interrupted educational tracks and current conditions of uncertainty, these teenagers and young adults represent a new 'lost generation' in the making. According to data from the 'National Centre of Social Solidarity' (EKKA), the Greek competent authority for Unaccompanied Minors (UM), at the end of 2018, there were 3.741 UMs in Greece, 93% of whom were over 14. Only 26% lived in appropriate settings (specialized accommodation centres) that may allow access to educational opportunities, while a shocking 14% were officially homeless.[45]

For young adult refugees or those reaching adulthood, the lack of educational and meaningful employment opportunities often goes hand in hand with increased boredom. The lack of creative activities and pervasive ennui has been a constant theme in participants' replies, especially in the 18–25 age group. The majority preferred to tackle this ennui by spending time with friends, developing personal hobbies, and to a lesser extent collective activities. Another way to battle ennui was frequent trips to the city. It is rather unsurprising that this was more common in camps with easy and fast transport to the city centre (i.e. Elaionas). These out-camp excursions take various forms. For participants with families (most often in older age groups), visits to the city revolve around shopping needs, which are most of the times performed by the male head of the family. Many said that they avoided taking their families to the city because 'children asked for things they could not afford'. On the contrary, younger participants were more likely to leave the camp on a regular basis (daily or few times per week).

Time spent outside the camp tends to reduce institutionalization and increase the interaction with the settings and the society that they will

encounter when they eventually leave the camp. In urban camps, such as Elaionas, familiarization with the city settings is to some extent achieved. However, as one survey participant said, refugees that live in camps far from the city lack basic skills, such as getting a bus ticket. In either case, the interaction with the Greek society is almost non-existent. This is evident in the low number of survey participants, who had made Greek friends since their arrival to Greece. In most cases, these 'new Greek friends' were camp personnel (guards, NGO workers). This lack of interaction with the wider society mirrors the broken communication of Greek authorities with the refugees and adds a second layer of communication barriers with the 'other'.

Institutionalization, suboptimal living conditions, lack of employment opportunities and means of sustainment often lead to negative coping mechanisms, such as crime, prostitution, and substance abuse.[46] Negative coping mechanisms of this kind abound in Greece, as several instances of prostitution (including minors), substance abuse and trafficking have been documented.[47] These negative coping mechanisms fuel illegal activities, such as smuggling and drug trafficking, which eventually subsume the benevolent 'black economy' of refugee-run businesses. Greece, as a central node in the eastern Mediterranean smuggling route, offers several opportunities of this kind. Some of these activities unfold in plain sight. For instance, refugees' selling contraband cigarettes has become a common sight in Athens. Other activities, such as drug trafficking and the sexual exploitation of women and minors, take place in a semi-concealed manner in public squares and parks, such as Pedion tou Areos.[48]

The survey showed that this type of illegal activities and 'anti-social' behaviour also affect camp security. For example, some participants claimed that in Moria, there were small gangs, who engaged in illicit activities and 'offered protection'. Overall, half of the participants rated security as below average – once again most in Moria – stating as main reasons the frequency of fights and the presence of people, who engage in anti-social behaviour or illegal activities. It is interesting to note that very few blamed the lack of security on insufficient police presence. Most claimed, though, that the Greek police intervenes only in major incidents and often rather late. Hence, more police presence would have a limited impact, which again highlights the tendency of Greek authorities to stand by; re-act rather than anticipate and pre-act.

Outburst of violence, negative coping mechanisms and associated crime, form a circle of insecurity in and around the camps, which in light of limited police interference might slide into a no-go zone in the future. In this environment, not only criminal activities find cover, radicalization and militant activities can equally thrive. Although there is no direct relationship between crime and terrorism, there might be some interconnecting lines linking the two. On the one hand, the underlying grievances that push individuals to radicalization or crime are quite similar, placing them in the same demographic pool for

recruitment. On the other hand, crime-involved recruits might offer experienced human capital with useful skills and connections. They know how to stay under the radar, procure forged documents, weapons, and funds and, most importantly, they possess tried-and-tested familiarity with violence.[49] Indeed, recent scholarship on the crime-terror nexus has identified a change in the profile of 'Islamist radicals' and an increase in militants with a criminal past and often periods of incarceration.[50] Hence, refugees, especially those with some military experience, might be seen as suitable candidates for recruitment both in criminal and militant activities. By the same token, one cannot preclude cases of crime-terror cross-overs in the future.

In sum, Greece presents a mixed record. Since 2015, Greece has demonstrated a determination to address the 'refugee crisis', due to a period of relatively refugee-friendly government policies and a drop in far-right activity. However, with the exception of children's education, Greece scores low in all the other socio-economic indicators that affect long-term radicalization, especially employment opportunities and the interaction with local society. Moreover, the policy of 'uninvolved tolerance', which characterizes most of the interactions between Greek authorities and refugees, creates a wall of distrust, while allowing '*black economy*' practices to arise and external actors to exert influence. Particularly vulnerable to radicalization are young refugees, who have practically no employment opportunities and no future and seem to fall victim to various negative coping mechanisms. They might become the 'perfect candidates' for radical groups in the future.

Conclusion

The exploration of the radicalization potential of refugees in Greece shows a mixed picture and some counterintuitive results. At the level of individual, old and new grievances, frustration, psychological vulnerability and diverse reactions to 'acculturative stress', all compile a picture of significant vulnerability to militarization/radicalization. However, the survey shows that the (Sunni) Syrian refugees, who better fit the profile of the radicalized, present lower levels of vulnerability. This is evidenced in their stated cause of flight, which largely places them in the category of *situational* refugees, and the higher – among Syrians – *detachment* from their country of origin. To some extent, it can be also discerned in Syrians more *positive reaction* to 'acculturative stress'. On the contrary, the Afghan and Iraqi communities appear more militarization-prone. This is based on the larger concertation of *persecuted* refugees among Afghans and Iraqis, the relatively stronger bond between them and their home countries and the prevalence of negative reactions to 'acculturative stress' (e.g. self-segregation). However, this (early) conclusion should be taken with caution, as the sample of the study is statistically loaded with participants from the Yazidi and Shia (Hazara and Sadat) communities.

Moreover, Greece seems to lack a developed local radical milieu that could act as a conveyor belt for refugees' personal grievances. Most importantly, its level of access to refugees is limited. If any, it is Christian (evangelical) groups that reach out to refugees in Greece. This practice often instigates a defensive reaction among Muslim refugees, who appear to shield behind their religious identity more after these encounters. Even though Greece does not have a developed radical milieu, it faces several challenges and structural deficiencies in the management of places of worship, which will intensify in the future, as an increasing number of refugees move out of camps. At the same time, Greece's policy of 'uninvolved tolerance' to refugees' religious needs and practices creates a vacuum of influence that might be filled by external powers or possibly even radical groups. At the present, Greece also does not seem to have an *active imported* radical milieu, which is often associated with *state-in-exile* refugees. However, there is evidence of a nascent collective identity formation among refugees in the form of out-group distrust.

At the level of state policies – Greece presents a mixed record. Although hardly without problems, Greece appeared relatively **willing** to address the 'refugee crisis', at least compared to other European countries. The rise of a Syriza-led government and a lull in far-right activity allowed Greece to develop a wide array of policies and arrangements, which though fall victim of the bureaucratic nature of Greek administration, mismanagement and lack of long-term planning.

With the exception of children's education, Greece scores low in all the other socio-economic indicators that co-define the refugee experience and could ideally mitigate pre-existing grievances and prevent the formation of new. It should be noted, though, that living conditions and the overall experience improves as one moves from island hotspots (e.g. Moria) to urban settings (e.g. Elaionas). This supports the argument that open camps in urban areas offer better conditions, improved security and better prospects of integration compared to nominally closed remote camps. An interesting finding is that camps seem to become the focal point for asylum seekers with no steady place to live. This often takes the form of makeshift accommodation arrangements in areas around the camp or the rise of an accommodation '*black economy*', in the form of unofficial subletting of camp houses. The latter highlights the failure of Greece to guarantee a transition to alternative housing, as well as the limits of the policy of 'uninvolved tolerance'.

In any case, the relative improvement of conditions is in no position to fully mitigate the pervasive ennui, institutionalization and limited interaction with the Greek society, while the lack of employment opportunities and means of self-sustainment become more pronounced as refugees move to the mainland. This translates into a persisting dependence on external sources for life-sustainment (international organizations or friends and family in other

European countries), which in turn reduces the feeling of self-dependence, while depriving Greece of a working force that could contribute to Greece's recovery.

However, the most crucial, perhaps, policy field, where Greece seems to fail is the provision of a viable future for the thousands of young refugees that form the 'lost generations' of their conflict-torn countries. With limited educational opportunities in practice and practically no employment opportunities, they form the 'perfect candidates' for negative coping mechanisms, such as crime, prostitution, and substance abuse, which are commonplace as the study shows. These youngsters demonstrate the kind of frustration and lack of prospects, and often the necessary skills, that render criminal activities and enterprises a meaningful alternative. These same characteristics render them 'suitable candidates' for radical groups.

In sum, Greece hosts a refugee population with considerable pre-existing grievances, which interestingly though, are more prevalent in individuals and communities that do not fit the typical radicalization profile. Although at the moment Greece does not have a developed radical milieu that could capitalize on refugees' grievances, this does not mean that Greece is safe from future security challenges. There is an emerging change in the political climate, spearheaded by the post-Golden Dawn realignments in the Greek far-right and the victory of the right-wing New Democracy party in the July 2019 elections. The new government's decision to downgrade the Ministry of Migration Policy to the level of under-secretariat in the Ministry of Citizen Protection, sets a security-oriented, but not necessarily secure, tone.

Notes

1. McCauley and Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization," 416.
2. Interview with the head of of the MSF mission in Greece, Apostolos Veizis (October 23, 2018).
3. Farhat et al., "Syrian Refugees in Greece."
4. Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries*.
5. Ibid.
6. Joly, "Odyssean and Rubicon Refugees."
7. Aitima, "Waiting: Asylum Seekers in Greece [Στην Αναμονή: Αιτούντες άσυλο στην Ελλάδα]" [Greek].
8. Hall, "Are Migrants More Extreme than Locals After War?" 6–7.
9. Digidiki and Bhabha, "Emergency within an Emergency", 18, 32; and Emmanouilidou et al., "Conditions in Refugee Camps", 9.
10. Neumann, *Radicalized*.
11. Greece of course has an indigenous Muslim community, which is concentrated in Thrace and its status is determined by the Treaty of Lausanne. For various reasons, though, it has not demonstrated any type of terrorism-related radicalization. Local Imams have in fact condemned Islamic radicalism. Vima, "Thraki

Muftis denounce the barbarous acts of jihadists [Μουφτήδες της Θράκης καταδικάζουν τις βάρβαρες πράξεις τζιχαντιστών]" [Greek].

12. Roussos, "The Athens Mosque From a Foreign Policy Tool."
13. Kathimerini, "Unlicensed Mosques in Spotlight"; and Triantis, "The Muslim 'Tribes' of Athens [Οι «φυλές» των μουσουλμάνων της Αθήνας]" [Greek].
14. Proto Thema, "We are Embittered with the Athens Mosque [Είμαστε πικραμένοι με το τζαμί της Αθήνας]" [Greek].
15. Triantis, "The Muslim 'Tribes' of Athens [Οι «φυλές» των μουσουλμάνων της Αθήνας]" [Greek].
16. Interview with the head of Salaf-us-Saalih mosque in Athens, Ahmed Eldin (November 8, 2018).
17. See for instance https://islamforgreeks.org/. It has Greek-language content and as such it is mainly aimed at Greeks and long-staying migrants.
18. Interview with Ahmed Eldin (see note 16).
19. Ibid.
20. Lambropoulos, "Jihadist Recruitment Network in Greece [Δίκτυο για στρατολόγηση τζιχαντιστών και στην Ελλάδα]" [Greek].
21. Deutsche Welle, "Terror at the Moria Refugee Camp."
22. Harpviken, "From 'Refugee Warriors' to 'Returnee Warriors'."
23. Observatory of the Refugee and Migration Crisis in the Aegean, "Violent Clashes in Moria RIC".
24. Harney, "Precarity, Affect and Problem Solving"; Wall et al., "Syrian Refugees and Information Precarity"; and Gillespie et al., "Syrian refugees and the Digital Passage to Europe."
25. Veldhuis and Staun, Islamist Radicalisation.
26. Jacobsen, "Can Refugees Benefit the State?"; and Whitaker, "Refugees in Western Tanzania."
27. See note 4 above.
28. Souliotis, "The Communicating Vessels of Far-Right Extremism [Τα συγκοινωνούντα δοχεία του ακροδεξιού εξτρεμισμού]" [Greek].
29. The actual number might be higher as official statistics only account for asylum seekers 'residing in accommodation centers under the supervision of the Greek state'; and Ministry of Digital Policy, "Newsletter on the Refugee-Migration", 6.
30. On the bumpy road to the creation of the Greek Asylum Service, see Dimitriadi, Irregular Afghan Migration to Europe, 110–113.
31. Ministry of Digital Policy, "Accommodation facilities for asylum seekers in mainland Greece".
32. Ibid., 7.
33. Ministry of Digital Policy, "Newsletter on the Refugee-Migration".
34. Deutsche Welle, "Sisyphus Ordeal for Refugees in Greece".
35. Kotronaki et al., "Living Resistance"; and Lafazani, "Homeplace Plazza."
36. Dimitriadi, "Governing Irregular Migration at the Margins of Europe," 84.
37. EUROSTAT, "Mean and Median Income by Household Type".
38. Knapton, "The Recruitment and Radicalisation of Western Citizens," 41, 44.
39. Ministry of Education Research and Religious Affairs, "2nd round of interviews for the European Qualifications Passport for Refugees [2ος κύκλος συνεντεύξεων για το 'Ευρωπαϊκό Διαβατήριο Προσόντων Προσφύγων']" [Greek].
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41. UNICEF, "Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe."

42. Ministry of Education Research and Religious Affairs, "*Refugee Education Project* [Το Έργο της Εκπαίδευσης των Προσφύγων]" [Greek], 50–56.
43. Observatory of the Refugee and Migration Crisis in the Aegean, "Parents' Protest in Chios."
44. See note 40 above.
45. EKKA, "Unaccompanied   Minors   in   Greece: 31   December   2018 [Επικαιροποιημένη κατάσταση: Ασυνόδευτα Ανήλικα (Α.Α.) στην Ελλάδα]" [Greek].
46. See note 26 above.
47. Digidiki and Bhabha, "Emergency within an Emergency"; and Freccero et al., "Sexual Exploitation of Unaccompanied Migrant and Refugee Boys in Greece."
48. Malihoudis and Tsirabidis, "Refugees and Migrants on the Drug Path [Πρόσφυγες και μετανάστες στον δρόμο των ναρκωτικών]" [Greek].
49. Basra and Neumann, "Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures."
50. Gallagher, "'Criminalised' Islamic State Veterans."

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