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Title: Greek intellectuals, Europeanization and constitutional evolution in post-war  
Greece (1952-1975)

### Abstract

Since the establishment of the modern Greek state, the European influence on a constitutional level, largely due to the Greek intellectuals, is notable. In the twentieth century, the new generation of liberal intellectuals, including Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Konstantinos Tsatsos and Giorgos Theotokas, regarded further constitutional reform as necessary for Greece's development and Europeanization. The Civil War of the 1940s and the prevalence of old political parties ultimately led to the excessively conservative Constitution of 1952 that caused a deviation of Greece from contemporary European constitutional evolution. Indeed, Greek intellectuals, including constitutional experts, warned against it. In 1963, Tsatsos, member of Karamanlis' ERE, prepared a proposal for a constitutional revision, known as "Deep Incision", aiming to strengthen the executive and deal with the institutional effects of the Civil War. Tsatsos had studied Western European constitutional trends, but the effort led nowhere because of the adverse reaction of the opposition and the Palace. The major constitutional evolution took place only in 1975. A product of the cooperation of Tsatsos-Karamanlis, the new Constitution was a conscious effort to follow European institutional developments, as it was thought to be an integral part of Greece's Europeanization.

#### I. Bourgeois intellectuals, Greece's Europeanization and the need for constitutional revisions

The question of Greek identity and the place of the country in the world experienced a turning point in the 20th century and, more precisely, in the interwar period. Two main factors contributed to this shift in thinking; on the one hand the defeat of Greece against the Turkey of Kemal and the expulsion of the Greeks from the eastern coast of the Aegean Sea in 1922; on the other hand, the evolution of radical liberalism in Greece. (Poimenidou, 2014, 106)

Under these circumstances, a new generation of radical liberal intellectuals emerged. This group – the so called "bourgeois" – even if it was far from being homogenous, as within it we find representatives who are politically integrated from the Centre to the wider Right, it represented a common request: a much-needed change that required the modernization of the country following the norms and values of the West. The three

personalities that represent the core of the group were Yorgos Theotokas, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Konstantinos Tsatsos. Composed of philosophers, professors and politicians, this group presented a variety of intellectual figures, which gave it a specific characteristic. Its ability to influence both inside and outside the country, due to the political activity of its members, contributed to the recognition of Greece as a substantial part of Europe. From the very beginning, they approached the question of Europe from a broader perspective, in which culture and its value figured prominently. For this group of intellectuals, Europe was not just an option, it was also the only orientation for Greece. (Poimenidou, 2020, 43) It is also important to underline that these intellectuals did not get familiarized with Europe through Greece. On the contrary, we can argue the reverse, that is, they got familiarized with Greece through Europe. Being members of the bourgeoisie, they had been brought up in a European environment.

It is obvious that my education was not Greek, but cosmopolitan. [...] I learned the stories of the Greek traditions and the words, phrases and proverbs associated with them when I was an adult. By contrast, the myths and customs of Western Europe were very familiar to me. With German songs I could understand Christmas, my toys came from France and my clothes from England. [...] Thanks to political chauvinism, I felt Greek. [...] I was like a corresponding member of the society of the West. (Tsatsos, 2000, 64-65)

Yorgos Theotokas had studied in Paris, whereas Kanellopoulos and Tsatsos were representing the Heidelberg School of Thought in Greece.<sup>1</sup> Despite their diversity in terms of political orientation, these intellectuals believed deeply in a special relationship between Greece and Europe insofar as, thanks to Europe, democratic values could be defended and promoted in Greece.<sup>2</sup> Theotokas wrote: “we cannot separate our destiny from the destiny of Europe”. (Theotokas, 1996, 341)

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<sup>1</sup> Kanellopoulos and Tsatsos had also been professors at the university of Athens, having the opportunity to influence a generation that later on, would be part of the political scene and in key-positions regarding Greece’s European integration. (Poimenidou, 2020)

<sup>2</sup> Their philosophical approach was similar, in particular regarding the purpose of Europe, the purpose of Greece and the special bond between the two. (Poimenidou, 2020, 43-50)

The same intellectuals, since the 1930s, showed an interest in regards to the constitutional organization of the country, and participated in the public debates through the publication of articles and essays. The 1930s was a period of crisis, with the changes of the governments and the military interventions being numerous.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, this decade offered the necessary basis for the search for a much-needed change. They had already established a reformist discourse, that set as a precondition the overcoming of the dipole Venizelism-anti-Venizelism, which had prevailed in the first quarter of the century. More specifically, they had worked on the idea of a complete constitutional reform: Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, as leader of the National Unity Party, George Theotokas as the theoretician behind Georgios Papandreou's Democratic Socialist Party and its rather radical proposition of introducing the Presidential System in Greece (Kourkouvelas, 2013, 80-86), and during the occupation, Konstantinos Tsatsos, as founder of the Socialist Union, an organization with a strong reformist and anti-monarchist character (Koumas, 2010). The Socialist Union envisioned the formation of a solidly structured regime, in the form of Republic:

The Greek nation has a valuable status and historical mission to fulfill. (...) It has the historical record of claiming autonomous political status. For historical reasons, for reasons of moral order and for political reasons the Greek nations need to be formed in a democratic state, where intellectual and political freedom will be secured. (Tsatsos, Archive, B. 49/2)

The main goal behind Tsatsos' philosophy was for the country to obtain governmental stability and follow the European norms.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, a close cooperation between the government and the head of state, that is the President of the Republic, was necessary.

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<sup>3</sup> The National Schism that tormented Greece since 1915 (Mavrogordatos, 2015), led to the Restoration of the monarchy in 1935 and the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas a year later.

<sup>4</sup> Since the establishment of the modern Greek state, the European influence on a constitutional level, largely due to the Greek intellectuals, is notable. For example, in 1921, Alexandros Svolos, an important figure among Greek constitutional lawyers, enthusiastically commented on the Weimar Constitution (1919). He had noted that it was beyond its time and the American and European Constitutions. As a matter of fact, largely thanks to the intellectuals who were part of the 30-member committee, its influence was manifested in the Greek Constitution of 1927, being the first Constitution in Greece to establish elected Head of state and social rights. (Alivizatos, 2011, 450-451)

It could be argued that this group of intellectuals represented the moderate forces who desired radical reforms and were determined to act within a national and democratic framework.

## II. Constitutional revisions, the specificity of post-war Greece and the role of intellectuals

The end of the Second World War marked a new era. The multi-centered international system was replaced by a bipolar one. Post-war Europe, after having lost its leading role, needed to adapt to this new balance. The war had also highlighted the need of strengthening the rule of law, and therefore, the need of constitutional revisions. It is characteristic that during this time, two major developments marked the European constitutional law: the recognition of the binding nature of the Constitution as a legal text, and the significant shift to human rights. On an international level, this could be seen as a response of the liberal democracies to the atrocities of Nazism and Fascism, accompanied by the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and in Western Europe in particular, the signing of the ECHR (European Convention of Human Rights) in 1950. Moreover, the rising Western model of governance, primarily in the interventionist state which aimed to plan development with rational interventions in the free economy. (Alivizatos, 2011, 453) Even Western European countries where there was a strong communist movement, such as France and Italy, in the early post-war era adapted to the new tendencies, by forming large coalitions with the participation of all anti-fascist forces, and therefore avoiding the civil war and drafting new Constitutions as well as new development programs with a modern orientation. Presented as historically a new departure, they manifested the shift towards the much-needed “new spirit”. (Conway, 2002, 63) Parliamentary democracy had become the standard model of political organization. (Conway, 2002, 59)

On the other hand, post-war Greece presented a vastly different evolution. Greece’s orientation within the new bipolar system was not a question easily answered. According to the Churchill-Stalin “Percentages Agreement”, signed in October 1944, Greece was to be part of the ‘Western’ sphere of influence. (Resis, 1978) However, the country’s orientation was not taken for granted within the borders. The popularity, the communist forces had gained after the role they played in the resistance during the war,

led to claims concerning the national governance. The distance in the views of the communist left and the non-communist forces was manifested since the first attempts to reach a compromise on the formation of an all-party government. The situation culminated in the December 1944 battle of Athens (Nikolakopoulos, 2003), the first manifestation of the new post-war international balance, as the poet and diplomat, Yorgos Seferis, aptly observed. (Seferis, 1979) The Civil war, that followed, provoked the domination of extreme anti-communist views. (Nikolakopoulos, 2003) It was a huge setback that created not only material damage, but also political changes, a severe internal security policy and great mistrust in public opinion. (Iatrides, 1995, 1-30) The old parties of the National Schism<sup>5</sup> reappeared in a dominant way: the liberal party, around its traditional anti-monarchist discourse; the people's party, which had been split into five factions after 1936 (four of which were republican), was reunited in late January 1945 – following the events of December 1944, incorporating ardent supporters of the monarchy. In a moment of extreme uncertainty and internal and external insecurity, the people, who were looking for survival, turned to the old patronage networks of the old parties. (Tzermias, 1991, 89-109) Thus, their approach to reality was no longer up to date. This meant that they were unable to adapt to the new political and economic data of the Marshall Plan, the basis of the economic revival of Western Europe. All this clearly shows how complex the situation in Greece remained until the early 1950s.<sup>6</sup>

#### i. The 1952 Constitution

The Civil War had led the country to an impasse. Faced with the threat of Communist victory, the blindly anti-communist forces first fought against this threat, such as the

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<sup>5</sup> National Schism is the splitting of society, political order, governing and military powers Greece experienced during the period of the First World war. While king Constantine I opted for neutrality, Eleftherios Venizelos opted for alliance with the Entente, believing this choice would ensure the country's interests. Despite Venizelos' prevalence, the results were deep-rooted in the society and influenced the balance and evolution of the Greek political scene for many decades. (Gounaris & Christopoulos, 2019; Mavrogordatos, 2015).

<sup>6</sup> The "conservative" solution that prevailed in Greece should not be studied without taking into consideration American attempts to "restore" the great political parties of the past. The situation inside Greece after the World War was difficult because of the destabilization of the political scene. Moreover, the certainty both of the Americans and of a large part of the Greek politicians that there was the danger of communist domination in Greece, led them to seek such a solution. (Stefanidis, 1999, 138).

IDEA<sup>7</sup>, which correlatively weakened the forces of moderation and reform. This can explain why most of the anti-communist politicians showed an attitude of absolute opposition to communism. Konstantinos Karamanlis, for example, used the term "communist danger" in his writings, pointing out that "the vote of the Greek people reflected their anxiety and fear for the future". (Svolopoulos, 1997 (5), 44) Greece would be the first European country of the West to open a *stricto sensu* concentration camp in Makronisos. (Alivizatos, 2011, 343) The Communist Party with the so-called Third Resolution (l. 509/1947) became illegal. The consequences of the Civil war were severe. Therefore, Greece was removed from the reform trajectory that the rest of post-war Europe had entered and this was heavily manifested in the constitutional evolution of the country.

Despite the high expectations for a substantial institutional reform after such a long and multifaceted ordeal of the country, the first post-war Constitution was a disappointment. Having been called "obsolete from birth" (Dagtoglou, 1966), the 1952 Constitution was an immediate result of the circumstances in Greece, and had two major weaknesses: on the one hand, it was ultra-conservative and on the other hand, it was accompanied by a "parasyntagma"<sup>8</sup>, namely the maintenance of a security apparatus that targeted the Communists and created an extremely tense situation. (Alivizatos, 1986, 203-277 & 525-600) This Constitution interrupted the movement towards the incorporation of state interventionism which had already been noted in the institutional framework of the country since 1911. Moreover, it was the result of the defensive psychosis of the "urban" system, making it move in the opposite direction from both Greek tradition and the international trend of the time. (Hatzivassiliou, 2010, 253-254)

In fact, the Constitution was drafted by the Parliament of 1946, that is, the Parliament of the Civil War, and was approved by the Parliament of 1951.<sup>9</sup> It was therefore designed by a parliament dominated by the old political forces. Therefore, it was bound

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<sup>7</sup> The Holy Liaison of Greek Officers, better known by the acronym IDEA in Greek, was a secret organization of Greek Army officers who became involved in the country's political affairs, especially after the liberation and the ensuing civil war, in order to deal with "any threatening threat". It was created by pro-royal officers, whose positions were not far from those of the dictatorial regime of Metaxas. (Linardatos, 1977; Veremis, 2000)

<sup>8</sup> Acts not in accordance with the Constitution (Syntagma) but tolerated due to the circumstances.

<sup>9</sup> On an interesting note, the 1952 Constitution has been characterized a Constitution of the Right that was voted by the Center. (Alivizatos, 2011, 366).

by the 1946 referendum on the form of government as a Constitutional Monarchy. The innovations were very limited – the most remarkable one being the fact that for the first time in modern Greek history the right to vote was extended to women. In general, however, Greece was "led backwards". For the first time, the country could be declared under siege from not only external but also internal dangers, while with regard to individual rights, there was a repetition of many provisions of the 1911 Constitution but much stricter. For the first time, the purpose of education was defined as the need for the young students, the citizens of tomorrow, to develop the national ideology. There were also important limitations when it came to the freedom of the press, as well as the right to strike. In practice, there was a degradation of the role of the Parliament. (Alivizatos, 2011, 366-372) The 1952 Constitution failed to provide for the new institutional needs of the post-war era, and in particular for the manifestation of state intervention in the economy, a direction towards which all Western countries were moving. (Vlahopoulos, 2018, 199-213; Hatzivassiliou, 2018, 214-247) In other words, it defended an institutional and social status quo, but it did not facilitate its radical reform. (Hatzivassiliou, 2010, 254)

For the intellectuals, on which we have focused in this article, the need for a new Constitution was imperative. Kanellopoulos had written in 1948 that a new Constitution could lead to the "salvation of the nation". (Kanellopoulos, 2002) However, despite their presence in the political scene, and, even more, the involvement of some in the proceedings, they did not have the opportunity to have their radical point of views, already expressed in the 1930s, put in practice. Konstantinos Tsatsos was a member of the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament but could hardly influence the result. He believed that the only way Greece could obtain a secure future was the existence of a strong government:

The question of the regime, after the formal declarations of the leader of the Liberals, is a closed affair. It is only communists and cryptocommunist who ask this question today. There are, however, other difficulties that will arise from the political point of view: the formation of a strong government, something absolutely necessary for the reconstruction of the country. (Tsatsos, Archive, B. 51/1)

In May and June 1948, he wrote numerous articles mainly to highlight the need for strengthening the executive power and simplifying the work of the Parliament, as well as the need for establishment of regime defense procedures – that is, a step much closer to the tendencies in Western Europe. (Tsatsos, Archive, B. 54/4) Nevertheless, he defended its necessity due to Greece's peculiar circumstances. In 1951, in a lecture he prepared for the Americans, he emphasized that freedom equaled, more than anything, responsibility, and thus, the existing restrictions in the freedom of the press should be seen under this light. According to Tsatsos, the problematic provisions were numerous, making the need for improvement required. (Tsatsos, Archive, B. 54/4)

From the point of view of these intellectuals, the excessive conservatism of the Constitution would not achieve its main purpose, that is the fight and the prevalence against communism. On the contrary, the only result would be the further deviation of the country from the European standards of governance, which, for them, was of great importance since Greece was considered, as it was underlined above, an integral part of Europe, and its future could only be linked to that of the rest of the Western European countries.

## ii. The 1963 “Deep Incision”

On the other hand, alongside with the adoption of the Constitution, for the first time in the post-war era, Greece experienced a relative political stability. The prevalence of a new Right, first with Alexandros Papagos and later with Konstantinos Karamanlis, allowed the country to pursue the place it claimed as part of the West. (Stefanidis, 2007) After joining NATO in 1952, Greece's priority, on a level of foreign policy, was to open its horizons towards Europe so that there could be a limitation in its dependence on the USA. Since 1953, Greece sought to tighten the relations with the Western European countries, such as France and West Germany. (Svolopoulos, 2001, 117), by signing bilateral agreements of both economic and cultural nature. (Pelt, 2006, 80-81) Since 1953, Greece gradually became one of the fastest growing countries in the world (Kazakos, 2001, 191), which was fundamental for achieving the main goal: the Europeanization of the country and the approach with the EEC. The European path was chosen for political reasons. Democratic stability, defense of the country and economic

growth were the three basic axes on which Greece's European policy was to be built. (Botsiou, 2002, 147-148) On July 9, 1961, the agreement of association of Greece with the EEC was signed and, on November 1, 1962, it entered into force. The association marked the first step towards its European integration. The object of the agreement was to ensure "the constant improvement of the living conditions" of all the contracting parties, to promote the harmonious expansion of their trade, to reduce the gap between the economy of Greece and that of the Member States of the EEC, and to facilitate the subsequent accession of Greece to the EEC. (Botsiou, 1998) Participation in Europe was viewed as a factor of strengthening the international position of the country. (Botsiou, 2002, 151-153) The Karamanlis government's choice of Europe owed a great deal to the rise alongside it, in positions of responsibility, of the young generation of intellectuals who had placed the need for Europeanization at the center of their concerns: Tsatsos as Minister of Presidency and Kanellopoulos as Vice-President of the Government. Concerning the association of the country with the EEC, Theotokas, although a supporter of the Centre, was in favor of the European choice, as it was a path that went beyond political orientation. According to Theotokas: "Europe cannot be seen only as a geographical and economic unit. It is, first of all, a unity of spirit and culture." (Theotokas, Archive, B. - political essays)

However, the fact that this upward trend was not accompanied by the required institutional framework, made it precarious. The goals of the Greek government since 1961 – economic stability, faster growth and fairer distribution of the national income, as well as educational reform with an emphasis on the technical education –, in particular after the signing of the Association Agreement with the EEC the same year, set as a prerequisite the revision of the Constitution. During his campaign speech, in October 1961, Karamanlis had called the 1952 Constitution obsolete and an obstacle to the country's progress. (Svolopoulos, 1997 (5), 184-192)

Theotokas viewed a turn to a true democratic state as mandatory for the future:

The Greek Democracy existed before the existence of the Greek State. Such was its destination in the minds of the people who fought to make it. (...) We must therefore consolidate the Democracy in Greece, remove the elements, that are not intended for its climate, and the dangers that threaten it, so that we can address the great problems. (...) Let us help consolidate a

truly democratic regime, make Greece a State of law, for [the citizens] to gain an awareness of dignity and human rights. (Theotokas, 1996, 1046-1048)

The key officials of the Karamanlis government, including Kanellopoulos and Tsatsos, constantly reiterated that Greece needed a few years to reach a level at which growth would be more stable and self-sustaining. The revision of 1963, better known as “Deep Incision” – borrowing Panagiotis Kanellopoulos’ phrase from 1949 – was moving within this logic. For Tsatsos, the revision was necessary because of the new reality that had been formed in the last decade:

The enormous social progress on the one hand and the new economic conditions created after the war on the other, and beyond that, the internationalization of economic life forced the development of state activity in the social and economic sector and added new cases of state intervention for beneficial regulation of relations or protection of the weak. It therefore became necessary to expand and expand state powers and to operate the state machine rapidly so that it could respond to its rapidly expanding activity. (Tsatsos, Archive, B. 76/3)

According to him, the development and economic growth, achieved in the previous years, could only be established by adopting a constitution that ensured the necessary provisions, following the European norms. Comparing Greece to the other Western European countries, he acknowledged the vast difference on a constitutional level and how this difference hindered Greece from fully transforming into a European country. (Tsatsos, Archive, B. 76/3)

Taking this into account, it is no coincidence that the revision of 1963, which was prepared by Tsatsos, sought to strengthen those provisions that had been viewed as the most problematic concerning the economic development. Priority was given to the executive power by introducing the possibility of issuing legislative decrees and legislative acts for dealing with emergencies, the limitation of the parliamentary immunity, and the possibility of reorganizing the public administration. In the field of social rights, it introduced state protection for marriage, family, work and economic activity, while, in addition, the development of education, science and art was

expanded. Finally, regarding the "defense" of the regime, the prohibition of the abuse of individual rights to the detriment of the democratic regime, the establishment of the Supreme Court and its ability to outlaw parties aimed at overthrowing the regime were defined. (Hatzivassiliou, 2010, 388-390)

While preparing the revision proposal, as it appears through a series of notes, Tsatsos studied the current provisions of other European countries, in particular those of France. (Tsatsos, Archive, B. 76/2) His goal was the completion of the transition from underdevelopment to development within the framework of a genuine democratic system of governance, and the country's participation in Europe. (Tsatsos, Archive, B. 76/3) The "Deep Incision", in many aspects, reflected a major political choice, which, in its basic parameters, had been formed much earlier and its modernizing dimension was a conscious effort to adapt to the rest of Europe. (Hatzivassiliou, 2010, 393) Taking Tsatsos' handwritten notes on the Socialist Union's ideological orientation into consideration, it is evident that the basis behind the idea of the "Deep Incision" had already been formed in the early 1940s. (Tsatsos, Archive, B. 49/2)

However, the attempt remained unsuccessful, as the reactions from both the political world and the Crown, whose privileges were effectively threatened, were intense. Furthermore, the change within the Greek society precisely because of the development taken place in the previous years caused less and less tolerance of the wider Right and its rhetoric, with the centre of gravity gradually shifting towards the Centre and Georgios Papandreou's "Relentless Struggle". (Nikolakopoulos, 2001, 293-300) The political crisis and its result – the 7-year dictatorship – ultimately caused an abrupt pause at the social and political development of the country.

#### i. The Constitution of 1975

The fall of the Greek Junta in 1974 and the return of Karamanlis from Paris, marked a new era. The transition to democracy was difficult and complicated. It required delicate decisions and the contribution of all democratic forces. (Filandros, 2008, 294-316) From the first days after the end of the dictatorship, the Greek government proceeded to adopt measures that restored the democratic regularity. On August 1 of the same year, the government published the Constitutive Act by which the 1952 Constitution

came back into force. Even if it was an “emergency solution” (*To Vima*, August 2, 1974), since some laws of this constitution were outdated and did not cover the needs of the time, it was a significant decision in regards to the restoration of democracy. In the first week of August, the protection of human rights and judicial independence were back in force, as the new Minister of Justice declared:

The contemporary state must ensure the exercise of political and personal rights and create conditions for equal participation for all Greeks in political, economic and social life. [...] Respect for the Constitution and the laws, fidelity to the fatherland and to national unity are the supreme duty of all Greeks, for whose patriotism this restoration of the Constitution has taken place. (Svolopoulos, 1997 (8), 58)

However, post-dictatorial democratic Greece, contrary to other examples, dared to confront her authoritarian past, as Nikos Alivizatos has highlighted. (Alivizatos, 2011, 496). Not only were there sanctions on persons of the dictatorial regime, but what is more, the Communist party was recognized as a legal party – a decisive move that proved the determination to overcome the difficulties of the past. (Vlahopoulos, 2018, 303-315)

It was mandatory for Greece to be once again aligned with the European norms and principles. The consolidation of democracy, a distancing from the political tensions of the past and the modernization were the three political pillars of the Greek governments. Decisions were made quickly, illustrating the will to move beyond the difficulties and mistakes of the past, and to show the important advances for a stable future; a requirement that urged the constitutional revision. The political methodology followed did not comply with the formal provisions for a revision, as it was completed by one revisory Parliament and voted in a very short time: the plenary debate began in April and ended with its vote on June the 7<sup>th</sup> 1975. (Alivizatos, 2011, 499-500)

For Tsatsos, who was the chairman of the Constitutional Committee, the constitutional reform was his main field of activity in the first months of 1975. It was a major condition for the continuation of the country's upward course, as had been emphasized since 1963 and the failed attempt of the “Deep Incision”. The main principle was the Constitution to guarantee balance in the sphere of public life and to establish permanent

institutions unaffected by persons. It was also necessary for the new Statutory Charter of Greece not to be an indiscriminate and mechanistic transfer of foreign standards but to be adapted to the Greek conditions: The final result was characterized as a true "Greek Constitution". (Svolopoulos, 1997 (8), 441-444) In his parliamentary speech on June 7, 1975, Konstantinos Tsatsos stated that this Constitution "originated from the Greek spirit, was built according to the Greek measure and is dedicated to the Greek nation." (Svolopoulos, 1997 (8), 441-444) He believed that without the clarification and consolidation of the national position of Greece and the promotion of the "Greek Idea" in a transnational context, the desired institutional reform and development would not be achieved. (Hatzivassiliou, 2018, 327-348) However, with the situation still being sensitive, the dialogue was not sober. The controversy was intense. The enlarged role of the President of the Republic was summed up in his ability to dissolve the Parliament, provided that its composition was not in line with the sentiment of the people, in his desire to dismiss the government after a relevant opinion of the Council of the Republic, an advisory body, which for many reminded the old crown council, and lastly, in his possibility of calling a referendum in case of crucial national issues. (Alivizatos, 2011, 505-506) These expanded powers were seen by the opposition as means that were enabling him to turn from "regulator" to "authoritarian" of the regime, and therefore, there was a strong belief, that the new democratic regime would be inherently distorted. (Anagnostou, 2004, 71-116) For Karamanlis and Tsatsos, the main duo behind the new Constitution, however, these powers concerned the process with which the policy was formed. It is characteristic that regarding the balance of powers, as appeared in the Greek Constitution, it was placed it between the French and the German Constitution. (Alivizatos, 2011, 504)

The main priority was the smooth functioning of the regime: in the past, the conflict between the head of state and the elected prime minister had been a critical point, necessitating the emergence of a head of state, now in the form of the President of the Republic, who would take on the role of a symbol of unity, and not the role of a divisive factor. (Hatzivassiliou, 2010) The democratic and liberal character of the new Constitution, as well as its crucial role in the modernization of the public life testify to the disposition for modernization according to the western norms, without this meaning an indiscriminate transfer of foreign standards. On the contrary, it could be described as a conscious effort to follow European institutional developments, including the level

of human rights, on which Greece had shown a dismal record during the 1967-74 military dictatorship. (Vlahopoulos, 2018, 316-326)

The historical specificity of Greece, due to the Civil war, caused the deviation of the country from the Western European norm concerning its constitutional evolution. The 1952 Constitution was a constitution of its time. It was characterized by excessive conservatism, to the extent that many legal scholars characterized it as obsolete since its birth and considered the need for immediate reforms urgent. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that thanks to this constitution, Greece made great strides towards economic development and sought, under its auspices, to find the lost normalcy. However, the revisions, the intellectuals as well as the politicians of the radical current sought to implement, would remain unsuccessful for the next decade. It would need the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 to make real progress. The 1975 Constitution marked the end of a long journey to the creative renewal of the public life, as, with its adoption, Greece carried out – with a 30-year delay – the "constitutional revolution", that other European countries had made immediately after the end of the Second World War. It was a constitution that tried to overcome old weaknesses, combining the Greek parliamentary tradition with the latest conquests of the European constitutional culture. Upholding European standards was a major priority for the people who drafted the Constitution, seeing it as an integral part of Greece's Europeanization.

The role of these intellectuals in the constitutional evolution of post-war Greece is undoubtedly important, as some of them largely shaped it. The influence of the New Deal was undeniable. Theotokas, in his *Essay for America*, written after his journey in the USA between August 1952 and February 1953, considered it responsible for wanting to give back to the doctrine of equality its primary place in the hierarchy of values of democracy. (Theotokas, 2001 (1954), 91) The New Deal, however, required strong executive power. Interestingly this was the priority that these intellectuals sought in their proposed constitutional revisions, as there was no such provision in any of the Greek interwar constitutions. By studying their writings, one can detect numerous mentions of the importance of the executive power, like, for example, in Tsatsos' handwritten notes on the ideological orientation of the Socialist Union. Furthermore, it is also evident in the provisions that they attempted to revise in the years that followed

the Second World war, like in the case of the failed 1963 revision. According to their point of view, a constitution, that offered the necessary provisions concerning the institutions, was essential so that post-war Greece would be able to achieve its most important goal – its Europeanization.

However, was this the only way for the success of the Europeanization efforts? There is no doubt that a constitution that followed the norms of the time would contribute to achieving this goal. The author though considers that another factor should be taken into consideration. The Europeanization of the country after the war required economic development and political normalcy, the latter missing until the fall of the Greek junta in 1974. Nevertheless, from 1952 up until the early 1960s, during a time that the country experienced a relative only normalcy, the economic development was rapid and extensive, and contributed to the achievement of the first step towards Greece's European integration – the association with the EEC. The second step towards Greece's European integration – the accession to the EEC, in 1979 –, took place once again during a period of normalcy. In the first case, the Constitution in force, was the ultra-conservative one of 1952 while in the latter case, the 1975 Constitution which marked a new era. The differences between the two constitutions are extensive, however, the end result is similar. Taking this example into account, one could argue that Europeanization could be, to a certain extent, successful, even with a problematic Constitution, such as the 1952 one. What was imperative was the adaptation to the new status of the country as an associate-state of the EEC, which required a successful 1963 revision and the abolition of the “parallel state”, and, even more, the correct implement of the constitution – another factor that was missing until 1974. From the above, it appears that both political normalcy and correct implement of the constitution were two equally important factors for Greece's successful Europeanization. Therefore, one could argue that this “obsession”, these intellectuals showed in regards to the institutions and the executive power, was not so necessary, since, in spite of their importance, they were not the only missing piece for Greece's complete transformation into a true European country of the West.

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