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https://hdl.handle.net/123456789/369| Τύπος: | Διδακτορική διατριβή |
| Τίτλος: | Essays on Optimal Taxation |
| Εναλλακτικός τίτλος: | Δοκίμια στην Άριστη Φορολόγηση |
| Συγγραφέας: | [EL] Λιόντος, Γεώργιος[EN] Liontos, George |
| Επιβλέπων διατριβής: | [EL] Φιλιππόπουλος, Αποστόλης[EN] Philippopoulos, Apostolis |
| Συμβουλευτική επιτροπή: | [EL] Βασιλάτος, Ευάγγελος[EN] Vassilatos, Vanghelis [EL] Οικονομίδης, Γεώργιος[EN] Economides, George |
| Μέλος εξεταστικής επιτροπής: | [EL] Αλογοσκούφης, Γεώργιος[EN] Alogoskoufis, George [EL] Καμμάς, Παντελής[EN] Kammas, Pantelis [EL] Παλυβός, Θεόδωρος[EN] Palivos, Theodore [EL] Σακελλάρης, Πλούταρχος[EN] Sakellaris, Plutarchos |
| Ημερομηνία: | 09/11/2020 |
| Περίληψη: | Within a unified general equilibrium framework, we revisit the problem of international optimal taxation when policymakers commit and do not commit themselves to future policy, when they cooperate or not in their setting of policy, and when the underlying economies can differ in some key fundamentals. This rich setup allows us to shed light to some debated policy issues, namely, how cross-country asymmetries should shape the design of national tax policies and how in turn this design affects macroeconomic outcomes as well the distribution of benefits and costs from international policy cooperation. In addition, we study two kinds of international policy cooperation, flexible cooperation and rigid cooperation, which respectively mean that cooperative policies are country-specific or just single (one-size-fits-all). A general result is that, once we leave the symmetric world and allow for cross-country differences, flexible cooperation, although superior to Nash in terms of lifetime aggregate output and welfare, may hurt some countries so it is not Pareto improving. In the same direction, without policy commitment the standard results are reversed, meaning that cooperation proves to be counter-productive at least for a large range of parameter values. This happens mainly because, without commitment, capital tax rates are too high in general, so that tax competition, as implied by non-cooperation, works to mitigate this distortion. Putting all this together, we end up with a general second-best admission that in the presence of several distortions, taking just one out (here, lack of cooperation), is not necessarily productive. These results may partly explain why little progress has been made in moving to fiscal unions with cooperative national fiscal policies and why the burden of taxation has been shifted onto labor, the relatively immobile factor of production. Moreover, in the EU, this could rationalize the introduction of fiscal transfers from the winners to the losers. |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Τόπος δημοσίευσης: | Αθήνα, Ελλάδα |
| Σελίδες: | 188 |
| Θεματική κατηγορία: | [EL] Οικονομικά[EN] Economics [EL] Οικονομετρία[EN] Econometrics |
| Λέξεις-κλειδιά: | optimal taxation; asymmetries; commitment; non-commitment; cooperation; non-cooperation |
| Κάτοχος πνευματικών δικαιωμάτων: | Γεώργιος Λιόντος. All Rights Reserved |
| Διατίθεται ανοιχτά στην τοποθεσία: | https://www.didaktorika.gr/eadd/handle/10442/48517 |
| Εμφανίζεται στις συλλογές: | Υποψήφιοι διδάκτορες |
Αρχεία σε αυτό το τεκμήριο:
| Αρχείο | Περιγραφή | Σελίδες | Μέγεθος | Μορφότυπος | Έκδοση | Άδεια | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Thesis_09_November_2020_GLiontos.pdf | Διδακτορική Διατριβή Γεώργιου Λιόντου, Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών, Τμήμα Οικονομικής Επιστήμης | 166 σελίδες σελίδες | 943.58 kB | Adobe PDF | Του συγγραφέα (pre-refereeing) |  | Δείτε/ανοίξτε |